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Ill Disciplined (Bodies of Thought)
Laurie Johnson, University of Southern Queensland, QLD, Australia
Abstract: Interdisciplinary studies have long provided fertile ground for solving old problems, framing new ideas, and even
generating new disciplines. Yet there can be no doubting the persistence of old disciplinary boundaries, or the tendency of
these bold new interdisciplinary approaches to metastasize into conventional disciplinary formations. This paper will begin
with a personal story – a scenario that I am sure is familiar to most academics – of an encounter with a colleague who felt
that my attempted interdisciplinarity in a conference paper was in fact an outrageous abuse of material more proper to his
discipline than to mine. What I will then seek to do is explain this persistence of disciplinary boundaries and proprietary
protocols using, as seems to me to be appropriate for this purpose, a blend of phenomenological and psychoanalytic theory.
I will argue that the stakes in disciplinary turf wars may be more than academic reputations or even the prospect of retaining
a job. At stake in protecting a body of thought may well be the academic body itself, understood within a context of the
mind-body integrity of the thinker as a being capable of existing within the world. To think, I suggest, is to be bounded, so
thought of a world without boundaries is to imagine a world without a body of thought.
Keywords: Discipline Formations, Interdisciplinarity, Phenomenology, Psychoanalysis, Mind-Body Problem
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES HAVElong provided fertile ground for solving oldproblems, framing new ideas, and even generat-
ing new disciplines. Yet scholars who seek to
undertake studies in an interdisciplinary framework
regularly confront resistance to this imperative,
which might take any number of forms: funding
procedures that classify research according to tradi-
tional disciplinary formations; creation of a margin-
alized presence at academic conferences where the
strength in numbers tends to rest with the many who
represent conventional disciplines; the accreditation
of courses on the basis of endorsement by profession-
al bodies or discipline-specific associations; and the
list goes on. While it may be true that there are some
areas of scholarship in which interdisciplinarity is
more accepted than in others, this shortlist of forms
of resistance suggests that academia writ large – en-
compassing the institutional structures and processes
that frame the everyday practices of academics and
researchers – is oriented more toward the preserva-
tion of existing disciplinary formations than it is to-
ward the propagation of new fields of inquiry. Yet
this paper will attempt to re-orient our way of
thinking about an ‘academia writ large’ by shifting
the theoretical focus of this discussion back onto
academics themselves. Beginning with an anecdote
relating one such instance of encountered resistance,
this paper will delve into the issue of the lived exper-
ience of academics and researchers. The languages
that we will use will be multiple, drawing on phe-
nomenology and psychoanalytic theory in particular.
In this way, we shall see that the resistance suggested
at the level of an academia ‘writ large’ is but a logical
extension of a much more intimate relationship
between a scholar and the words with which he or
she represents a body of thought. This phrase ‘body
of thought’ is understood here as no simple meta-
phor; rather, it pertains to the deep levels of invest-
ment that academics and researchers possess in rela-
tion to the words they produce as a form of self-
fashioning.
We shall begin, then, with a personal anecdote, in
order to ground the discussion in the lived experience
of the academic – my lived experience, to be precise.
A number of years ago, I was scheduled to present
a paper entitled “Thinking Beyond the Brain: The
Psycho-Somatic” at the Millennium World Confer-
ence in Critical Psychology, and as preparation for
this big event I delivered a preliminary version of
the paper in an English Department postgraduate
seminar at The University of Queensland. The paper
proposed the use of a psychoanalytical model of
mind-body interaction, built around the concepts of
the psycho-somatic relation of the unconscious to
external phenomena (as developed byNicolas Abra-
ham and Maria Torok) and the ‘skin ego’ (as de-
veloped by Didier Anzieu), to intercede in the mind-
body debate that had long been waged within the
human sciences. Not being a critical psychologist, I
was not sure of the likely reception to this material
at the Millennium World Conference, and so was
keen to initially present the ideas in a more collegial
forum. I should perhaps have been more wary of the
likely reception in the postgraduate seminar, because
it was there, rather than at the conference, that the
paper was met with dissenting voices. Among those
in attendance at the seminar were faculty members
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from biological science or medicine – or perhaps
both, but then on reflection the point may be that to
an ‘outsider’ such a distinction is untenable. In any
case, following the paper, these fellow academics
responded with a series of questions aimed at estab-
lishing a simple refutation of the basis for my paper:
why should an English scholar presume to find new
meanings or uses for terms like ‘psychosomatic’
when the sciences have already extracted clinically
and therapeutically useful definitions from psycholo-
gical theory?
Their questions were, of course, strictly rhetorical
in mode and manner, yet the format of the presenta-
tion dictated that a reply must be forthcoming. My
reply was simply to suggest that one of the concerns
of English or language studies in general is the circu-
lation of terms within a range of discourses, and I
claimed that a term like ‘psychosomatic’ might be
thought of in this way as a ‘phrase in dispute’ that
remains far from settled. It should be remembered
here that this phrase, ‘phrase in dispute,’ is taken
from the work of the French philosopher Jean-
François Lyotard, but I refrained from mentioning
this name in my reply for fear that I may alienate
these audience members still further. Nevertheless,
the work of Lyotard had clearly informed not only
the reply but also the overall perspective held by this
speaker in relation to the communicative act in which
these words were being spoken. Applying the lessons
from Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition and The Diff-
erend, we may say that both question and reply in
this forum already presupposed the condition of ali-
enation. It was not simply the case that speaker and
audiencewere speaking in different tongues; wewere
claiming proprietary rights over a term, rendering
any dispute impossible. This then was a clear point
of discordance: my ‘phrase in dispute’ – as Lyotard
calls these pawns in language games – was already
a ‘proper name’ to which a whole universe of
meanings is attached and around which the linea-
ments of a clearly defined body of knowledge are
accumulated.
What these initial observations suggest is that if
anybody within this exchange could be said to have
been ill-disciplined, then it was not those dissenting
voices who sought to proclaim their proprietary rights
over the use of one of these phrases in dispute. If
anything, the scholar who had previously studied the
work of Lyotard – and who should therefore have
been more prepared by the lessons his work have to
teach us about the language games of academia –
had been lax in thinking that this postgraduate sem-
inar would be anymore or less conducive to a recept-
ive audience than any other forum. Yet this does not
mean that studies in Critical Theory, for example,
lead necessarily to pessimism. It simply means that
wemight take as more generally relevant the opening
gambit undertaken by Derrida when he addressed
theWashington School of Psychiatry on October 15,
1982 (later published as ‘My Chances’). Asked to
speak on the intersection of ‘Psychoanalysis’ and
‘Literature,’ Derrida began by proposing that these
two terms be taken as proper names, yet suggests
that chance should still determine where his words
might fall, given that he could never know precisely
to whom he was speaking or writing. Derrida’s
gambit reminds us that the indeterminacy of the ad-
dressee does not translate as an absence of an address-
ee. Just as he admits to being unable to control where
or how his words fall, Derrida remains mindful that
these words still obey the rules of language, its ‘cal-
culating capacity ... its code and game, with what
regulates its play and plays with its regulations’ (4).
It is because of his reference to the calculated play
of language that I refer to the opening of Derrida’s
paper as a ‘gambit’: even as he talks of the indeterm-
inacy of the addressee, he calculates his chances.
Derrida’s gambit, postulated according to the
‘code and game’ of language, is consistent with what
Lyotard refers to as the performativity of language
games in the postmodern condition; that is, that these
games are constituted in the presentation of a pro-
ponent and an opponent, yet without an external
referee or possibility of judgment. Language games
are not simply games with language, between ad-
versaries using linguistic units as playing pieces;
they are games in language, wherein the playing
field, the rules, and even the adversaries themselves
are linguistically constituted. Yet Derrida takes the
issue of language games one step further by consid-
ering the status of all linguistic units according to
the play of signification. In ‘My Chances’ he refers
to the ‘insignificance in marking’ that is shared
within language by the letter, the number, and the
proper name (15). He describes the paradox of the
mark, which is this: a mark must be capable of being
‘re-markable’ from one context to another, hence its
apparent solidity and the seeming permanence of its
capacity to refer to the same thing time and again,
yet this same iterability demands that the mark retain
no essential tie to its origin (its first utterance, its
referent, its meaning, or what you will) so that it is
free to ‘emigrate in order to play elsewhere’ (16).
This ‘insignificance in marking’ suggests, then, that
no proper name possesses any permanence in this
function and even a speech to theWashington School
of Psychiatry must be calculated to account for the
possibility that the proper names proper to this forum
must still be re-marked as such in order for them to
have a chance of functioning in this capacity.
Whatever lessons we might learn from Lyotard
regarding performativity in language games should
also be informed by Derrida’s comments regarding
the ‘insignificance in marking’ of the units of lan-
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guage. Accordingly, we could imagine that any
thought of the boundaries that inhere between discip-
linary formations, as if they possessed any kind of
permanence beyond their instantiation in a moment
of language use, is absurd: proprietary rights and any
other disciplinarymarkers are asserted at themoment
they are articulated, which is the re-marking to which
Derrida refers, and this indicates a slippage or ‘insig-
nificance’ of any sense of true territorial limits. Yet
the ‘as if’ in this previous sentence is precisely the
effect of disciplinary language games, since these
games seem perfectly well to enable proponents of
a discourse to delimit their words, their practices –
indeed, themselves or, better, their selves per se –
from others. Perhaps we already reach a point at
which we might therefore mitigate any charge on
my part of being ill-disciplined in my preparation
for the postgraduate seminar forum. With a back-
ground in Critical Theory, fashioned after the likes
of Lyotard and Derrida, my capacity to calculate my
chances in entering themind-body debatemight have
been hampered to some extent by the fact that the
terms of this debate have for decades – or for far
longer, if we trace the mind-body debate to its origins
in the Western philosophical tradition – been estab-
lished by a number of disciplines within the human
sciences as one of the bases for differentiating
themselves from each other. I use the word ‘estab-
lished’ deliberately here, since there is in these lan-
guage games a clear sense among the protagonists
that what ‘regulates its play’ is a fixed set of rules.
Put quite simply, this set of rules is nothing less than
the discipline itself.
To put this another way, it is one thing to argue
on the basis of generalized phenomena – the lan-
guage games of which Lyotard writes, or the funda-
mental properties of units of language, according to
Derrida – that discipline-based discourses are in
reality more intractable than they seem, but this does
not adequately explain why these discourses should
in fact seem so established, nor does it account for
the fact that when one ‘plays’ these games or ‘re-
marks’ a unit of language as if it possessed the hall-
marks of a proper name, one does so from within a
disciplinary formation. The difficulties that we are
dealing with here arise, I suggest, because the brand
of Critical Theory developed by Lyotard and Derrida
is phenomenological in its principal disciplinary
orientation. Even as they develop a critique of discip-
linary formations, they do so on the basis that their
own sense of methodology, of proper names, and of
a true object of analysis, has been shaped or at least
influenced by their own training in a particular dis-
ciplinary formation. Both Lyotard and Derrida had
studied the great phenomenologists – Hegel, Heide-
gger, Husserl, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and others
– before they embarked on critiques of the Western
philosophical tradition, and this training reveals itself
in a tendency to extract a general account of phenom-
ena from a specific experience. In the words of Gayle
Ormiston, in a foreword to Lyotard’s first book,
Phenomenology, phenomenological projects hinge
on ‘the intentional analysis of the lifeworld
(Lebenswelt), the intricate weaving of the “subject-
ive” (transcendental or otherwise) and the “intersub-
jective”’ (2). In this sense, then, Lyotard’s work finds
in phenomenology the reflexive strategy for opening
out philosophy as such to intentional analysis, and I
would argue the same could be said of Derrida’s
critique of the Western metaphysical tradition.
The difficulties that we are dealing with here arise,
then, because both Lyotard and Derrida proceed
outward from a specific philosophical expression or
practice to that which can be said to be true of the
whole history of philosophy. The risk in assuming
that the phenomenological critique of philosophy
could prepare a young postgraduate in calculating
his chances ahead of a presentation in an academic
forum is that it assumes that the phenomenological
project can be reverse engineered; that is, that what
is said to be true of the whole history of philosophy
could translate into salient lessons on how to manu-
facture a specific expression or practice, fit to the
context of its instantiation. In short, a critique of a
discourse will always inform a meta-discursive ex-
planation, but a meta-discourse does not translate as
lessons on how to speak or write within the limits of
the given discourse fromwhich it has been extrapol-
ated.Where does this leave the struggling postgradu-
ate? I suggest that if my preparations for the post-
graduate seminar could be said to be ill-disciplined,
then, it was not simply because I presumed to think
that the lessons learned from a background in Critical
Theory could be used to dismiss attacks onmy appar-
ent disciplinary faux pas. A more damning feature
of my response was that it was indeed based on les-
sons learned long ago rather than on the material
content of the immediate presentation. Rather than
revert to some fallback position informed by Lyo-
tard’s critique of philosophy, could I have more
gainfully responded by using the very terms that my
detractors sought to question my right to use?
Before answering this question in the final part of
this paper, I should point out that after the postgradu-
ate seminar, in preparing to present the samematerial
at theMillenniumWorld Conference, I substantially
revised the paper. We shall see that these revisions
transformed a paper designed to intervene in the
mind-body debate into a paper on disciplinary turf
claims revolving around this debate. My goal here,
in the present paper, is to some extent to reflect more
directly on the conditions that gave rise to this
transformation and, therefore, to bring a psychoana-
lytic perspective to bear on the issue of disciplinary
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formations. By focusingmore on the lived experience
of an encounter with resistance to an interdisciplinary
strategy, rather than on a general account of discip-
linary language games, we gain a better understand-
ing of what motivates these games, enabling discip-
linary boundaries to continue to function as if they
possessed a high degree of permanence. The key to
this psychoanalytic perspective, as outlined in
‘Thinking Beyond the Brain: The Psycho-Somatic’
is a particular understanding – a discipline-specific
one – of the ‘psycho-somatic relation’ between the
unconscious and its outside, which we shall explore
in more detail in a moment. On this point, though,
we can flag already the direction in which we will
be heading: an inclination to view the phrase ‘body
of thought’ as something more than a convenient
metaphor to describe homogenations of ideas, con-
cepts and principles within a single structure. We
shall seek to consider the role of the body in imagin-
ing bodies of thought.
When we use the term ‘psycho-somatic’ within a
psychoanalytical framework, we refer to a process
rather than a condition or state. Within this frame-
work, ‘psyche’ and ‘soma’ do not refer to ‘mind’
and ‘body’ respectively, such that wemight conceive
of them in isolation or even diagnose states based
on the effects of the one on the other. Instead, they
function as terms to describe two discrete but inter-
connected aspects of the same process. Mind and
body are viewed in these terms as being isomorphous
on the basis of what Richard Wollheim calls ‘the
mind’s image of itself’ (53). We only conceive of
mental states from the perspective of being already
embodied, so our conception of the mind is always
‘tinged with spatiality’ and thus ‘it is not merely that
we are at home in our body: we are at home in our
mind somewhat as in a body’ (53). The term ‘psycho-
somatic relation’ refers to the mind only in so far as
it is embodied, and it refers to the body only in so
far as it corresponds to the image the mind has of it-
self. This is to say that the body is not simply a con-
tainer for the mind, but is its extensive correlative.
Now, we may ask what this has to do with disciplin-
arity. As I mentioned above, after reflecting on the
postgraduate seminar in which I first delivered the
paper on the mind-body debate, I reworked the ma-
terial before presenting the paper to the Critical
Psychology conference – this new material was re-
tained when the full paper was then later developed
for publication in the International Journal of Critic-
al Psychology. What I added in revising the paper
was the term ‘embodiment’ to refer to the process
bywhich a psycho-somatic relation unfolds. Defining
embodiment in specifically psychoanalytic terms, I
called it the process by which the unconscious posits
an outside, meaning that one way to think of the body
is as the exterior limit of the unconscious, designating
an interior mental space and an external reality.
The spatiality in terms of which Wollheim sug-
gests we can only conceive of the mind is here recast
as a normative effect of unconscious processes, not
simply a side-effect of the fact that we are already
embodied when we cast a reflective eye back upon
ourselves. It seemed to me furthermore that the un-
conscious process of positing an exterior limit will
not necessarily end at this limit, but remains a func-
tion of the way we continue to extend and present
ourselves in the world. It is worth noting here that
Wollheim’s comments on mind and body form part
of his discussions on art and the mind. He focuses
attention on the corporeal basis of aesthetics by
suggesting that painting is equivalent to the body in
the degree to which both represent versions of the
mind’s image of itself. In the revised version of the
paper – published finally as ‘Thinking Beyond the
Brain: Embodiment and the Psycho-Somatic’ – I
developed the idea that ‘bodies of thought’ possess
equivalence to physical bodies in much the same
way that an artwork manifests a representation of
the mind beyond the mind itself, which brings us to
the relevance of these ideas to issues of disciplinarity.
Disciplines represent ways of maintaining intact the
apparent integrity of a body of thought. To tie this
back to the work of Lyotard and Derrida, language
games might therefore be seen as specific forms of
embodiment. They rely on the divisibility of themark
to designate permanence of an exterior limit which,
due to the paradox of this same divisibility, theymust
however designate time and time again. Using this
adaptation of Wollheim’s ideas, I suggested in the
revised version of the paper that the mind-body de-
bate exposed the fragility of discipline formations
precisely because the ‘idea of the body’ remained a
crucial component of the way in which disciplines
took on the appearance of form. This is how the
published version of the paper concludes:
What is at stake is not simply opening out the
boundaries of one discipline in response to a
challenge presented by another; rather, it is the
radical abandonment of the boundaries that have
traditionally separated one discipline from an-
other, one corpus from another, or one body of
ideas from another. If we find that we are still
protective of this body of ideas, it may only be
because we are still too attached to the idea of
the body. (68-69)
To a reader unfamiliar with the context out of which
this paper emerged, these closing words might read
like a defense of eclecticism or interdisciplinarity.
Yet as we have seen here, these words could be just
as easily attributed to what psychoanalysts call a
‘reaction formation’ and that a bundle of anxieties
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that had accrued around the postgraduate seminar,
its reception, and the larger forum that would follow
provided both the stimulus and raw material from
which this formation could be developed. It was not
so much that I sought to defend in advance the radic-
al abandonment of disciplinary boundaries for which
the paper now presented a rallying cry; this was a
defensive reaction, in hindsight, to a perceived attack
on my own set of ideas. In other words, my investig-
ation into the possibilities of abandoning established
boundaries was, in itself, already calculated along a
trajectory that was limited.
Nevertheless, this particular reaction formation
does provide the terms by which we might be able
to usefully conclude. I stand by the conclusions of
the critical psychology paper, that the mind-body
debate represents one particularly volatile zone of
disciplinary friction for reasons that I have outlined
above. Yet further reflection on the immediate per-
sonal context for the history of these words, their
marking and re-marking, suggests that these conclu-
sions might also be more generally relevant. In re-
sponse to those dissenting voices who questioned
the right of anybody in the Humanities to critique
such clinically useful concepts as the psycho-somatic
relation of mind to body, perhaps a valid reply could
well have been that according to the psychoanalytic
definition of this relation, the uses to which we put
words – just like the use to which we put our bodies,
our technologies, and indeed all phenomena exterior
to our unconsciousminds – are expressions of a basic
human drive to paint an outside in which we can
imagine ourselves perfectly centered. In a psychoana-
lytic sense, the names we own as we establish discip-
linary formations are but the clothes we adorn to
shelter our innermost selves from the elements. I
could therefore have simply asked if they would al-
together mind if I may borrow their coat. Yet perhaps
this does not quite get to the heart of the matter. It
might in fact be more appropriate to say that the
words we utter, and by which we presume to lay
claim to the world, function as substitutes for the
skin itself, the outermost membrane of our bodies.
In psychoanalytic terms, the ‘skin ego’ is precisely
the sense we possess that our skins are in fact the
outermost layers of a body, in which we feel embod-
ied.
Again, what does this have to do with discipline
formation? I suggest that disciplines, just like any
seemingly established and highly organized, intern-
ally coherent structure of language use, functions
like a second skin, or as an extension of the skin ego
process. The articulation of an idea, in isolation,
might therefore already be understood as a connec-
tion between a word, out there, and a thought, inside
here, within the mind-body relation. By connecting
these ideas to something more systematic, such as a
discipline, we cement this relation and, in the pro-
cess, cement our sense that we ‘belong’ within that
discipline. To surrender such connections is to
abandon ourselves, in some degree, so it is inevitable
that even when we venture into unstable environ-
ments such as interdisciplinary activity we find
ourselves continually being drawn to the establish-
ment of new connections, forming new disciplines
or new bodies of thought, so to speak. The important
point to make here is that if we think of these insights
as generally relevant, their methodological validity
is inseparable from the specific context from which
they emerged, and this may well be the lesson that
must be learned: every disciplinary act is at one and
the same time the act of an individual seeking con-
sciously or otherwise to position an academic body
within a second skin. This is very important to re-
member least of all when we are considering the
stakes and indeed the collateral damage in disciplin-
ary turf wars: what is at stake and what may therefore
be at risk in these ructions may be much more than
academic reputations or even the prospect of retain-
ing a job; what is at stake in protecting any body of
thought may well be the academic body itself, under-
stood within a context of the mind-body integrity of
the thinker as a being capable of existing within the
world.
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